In order to reduce the multiple-signature verification time 
Introduction
Paperwork is being rapidly digitized as e-mail, electronic commerce, and electronic money, etc. have become more and more widespread [3] [28] . In many of these new forms of communication, a digital signature is essential. Digital signatures have become more and more important in our modern electronic society because they can accomplish missions like identifying senders, authenticating message contents, preventing denial of message ownership, and protecting ownership. The fast development of digital signatures brings the demand for an efficient method of verifying digital signatures to make sure that they are signed by the same signer. For example, assume a sender is signing t documents for the receiver. The sender needs to generate t digital signatures, and it is often the case that the receiver needs to verify these t digital signatures one at a time. Since modular exponentiation means a very large modulus, it spends a lot of computation time. Verifying each DSAtype [10] or RSA-type [2] [16] [25] digital signature requires two or one modular exponentiation, respectively. In other words, if there are t DSA-type and t RSA-type digital signatures, the receiver will have to execute 2t and t modular exponentiations to verify these digital signatures, respectively, which is very inefficient.
The batch verifying multiple DSA digital signature scheme was first proposed by Naccache et al. [21] . In their scheme, the multiple DSA digital signatures are batch verified by the receiver, and all is done at a time. However, Lim and Lee [18] pointed out that Naccache et al.'s scheme [21] is insecure. Later, Harn [8] proposed a DSA-type secure interactive batch verification protocol. Later, Harn proposed two efficient non-interactive batch verification protocols: DSA-type and RSA-type multiple digital signatures [9] . Unfortunately, Shao [23] showed that the scheme proposed in [8] was not secure.
Recently, Hwang et al. [14] have pointed out in [9] that a dishonest signer can easily forge individual digital signatures and make false batch verifications valid. One of the reasons for attacks to succeed is that the dishonest signer does not make the multiple digital signatures in the original order (See [14] for a more detailed description). The signer would deny her/his having signed the messages, which means it has trouble preventing denial of message ownership. Hwang et al. proposed two simple batch-verifying multiple digital signatures called BV-DSA and BV-RSA schemes [12] [13] . They added t serial numbers or weights in the batch verification to withstand the attack. However, Bao et al. [1] showed that the probability for the receiver to be successfully cheated was actually as high as fifty percent in BV-RSA scheme. It would also make it possible for the dishonest signer to forge individual digital signatures and make false batch verifications valid. There are many schemes had been proposed for solving the problem [11] [15] [26] .
In this paper, we shall propose an alternative type of Ohta-Okamoto digital signature [22] based on the Fiat-Shamir scheme [7] . In order to achieve batch verification, we shall modify Ohta-Okamoto digital signature scheme and make the new modified scheme strong enough to withstand Hwang et al.'s attack [14] and Bao et al.'s attack [1] . Moreover, this paper will also prove that batch verification has the same security level as the original Ohta-Okatmoto digital signature scheme [22] , where signatures are verified individually.
In Section 2, we shall propose our digital signature scheme, which is a modified version of OhtaOkatmoto digital signature scheme [22] . At the same time, we shall show the batch verifying multiple digital signatures in our scheme. In Section 3, we shall analyze the security of the modified OhtaOktamoto digital signature scheme, neutralizing Hwang et al.'s attack [14] and Bao et al.'s attack [1] . In Section 4, we use the software to implement the proposed scheme and evaluate its results. In Section 5, the modified Ohta-Okamoto scheme is extended to a multi-signature version. Finally, we shall give a brief conclusion in Section 6.
Modified version of Ohta-Okatmoto digital signature scheme for batch verification
First of all, let's briefly review Ohta and Okat's digital signature scheme [22] as follows. Suppose we have a public integer L and a public modulus n which is the product of two secret large primes p and q. Next, we choose a secret integer sÎ R Z n as the private key and y = s -L mod n as the public key. Assume that a sender Alice wants to send a message m and its signature to some receiver named Bob. She performs the following steps:
Step 1: Choose an integer rÎ R Z n and compute u = r L mod n.
Step 2: Compute e = h(u, m), where h(·) is a public one-way hash function.
Step 3: Compute z = r ´ s e mod n.
Ohta and Oktamoto's signature of message m is (e, z). Then, Alice sends (e, z) and m to Bob. After receiving the signature, Bob first computes   =z L ´ y e mod n. The correctness of the signature on the message m can be verified by checking e = h( , m).
Here, we make some modifications on Ohat-Oktamoto digital signature scheme as follows. The parameters {L, n, p, q, y, s, m, h(×)} remain the same. Alice performs the following steps instead:
Step 2:
The signature of message m is (u, z) in our modified scheme. Then, Alice sends (u, z) and m to Bob. After Bob receives (u, z) and m from Alice, he proves the correctness of the signature on the message m
Generating Multiple Digital Signatures: Without loss of generality, assume that Alice wants to send t messages m 1 , m 2 … m t and digital signatures (u 1 , z 1 ), (u 2 , z 2 ), … , (u t , z t ) to Bob, where u i =    mod n and
by using the Alice's private key s.
Batch Verifying Multiple Digital Signatures: After receiving these digital signatures (u 1 , z 1 ), (u 2 , z 2 ), … , (u t , z t ) from Alice, Bob first randomly chooses an integer b and t other integers w 1 , w 2 … w t which are distinct and small. Then, he verifies the correctness of these multiple digital signatures (u 1 , z 1 ), (u 2 , z 2 ), … , (u t , z t ) on messages m 1 , m 2 … m t by using Alice's the public key y a and the public parameters to check the following equation:
If Equation (1) holds, the digital signatures (u 1 , z 1 ), (u 2 , z 2 ), … , (u t , z t ) on messages m 1 , m 2 … m t are correct. When a dispute occurs, say, if Alice wants to deny her having signed the messages, then Bob can show the following equation to prove that the individual digital signatures were actually singed by Alice.
The correctness of Equation (1) can be verified as follows:
and
The correctness of Equation (2) can be verified as follows:
In our scheme, Bob can verify these multiple digital signatures with Alice's public key, and only one verification session is required instead of t verification sessions. Hence, batch verification is obviously more efficient than verifying each individual digital signature separately.
Security analysis
In this section, we shall first analyze the security of our modified version of Ohta-Oktamoto digital signature scheme (Attack 1-3) and then separately break the attacks proposed by Hwang et al. [14] and Bao et al. [1] . In the following passages, several possible attacks will be investigated to demonstrate the security of our scheme.
Attack 1:
The private key s cannot be derived from the public key y and the public parameters n and L. To derive the private key s from the public key y = s -L mod n, the attacker has to face the intractability of the factorization (FAC) problem.
Attack 2:
The private key s cannot be derived from a valid digital signature (u, z).
To compute the private key s from z = r ´ s h(u;m) mod n, the attacker should find out what the random value r is. Then, she/he has to calculate the h(u, m)-th root of (z ´ r -1 ) mod n. However, the difficulty of retrieving r from u and extracting the h(u, m)-th root of (z ´ r -1 ) mod n is equivalent to solving the intractability of the FAC problem.
Attack 3:
The digital signature (u, z) on message m cannot be forged.
In order to forge the valid digital signature of message m, the attacker first randomly chooses an integer r and computes u = r L mod n and then compute a hash value h(u, m). To solve z such that
mod n without knowing the private s is equivalent to solving the intractability of the FAC problem. On the other hand, if the attacker randomly chooses a signature (u, z), she/he should find a message   such that  =   ×  (,) mod n. However, it is infeasible because h(·) is a collision free one-way function.
Note that the random number r should be kept secret. Otherwise, the attacker can obtain the private key s from two valid digital signatures (u 1 , z 1 ), (u 2 , z 2 ) as follows:
If the hash values h(u 1 , m 1 ) and h(u 2 , m 2 ) are relatively prime, the attacker can use the Euclidean algorithm [20] to reveal the private key s. As a result, Equation (1) For the same reason, the dishonest signer also cannot make the forged individual digital
, Those forged multiple digital signatures still cannot pass the batch verification in Equation (1) . If these signatures can pass the batch verification in Equation (1), they must be correct signatures. Hence, when a dispute occurs, Alice cannot deny her having signed the messages because Equation (2) holds.
Bao et al.'s Attack:
Because the factors p and q of n are generated by Alice, she has the ability to compute a value v 2 = 1 mod n. Assume that two signatures (   , z 1 ) and (u 2 , z 2 ) separately on message m 1 and m 2, are signed by Alice, where   =   ×  mod  and   =    mod n and   =   ×  (  ,  ) ( = 1, 2), Without the value b! in Equation (1), Bob randomly chooses two integers w 1 and w 2 to verify these multiple digital signatures in Equations (1). Unfortunately, the value w 1 Bob chooses is a multiplier of 2. It will make Equation (1) hold. However, when a dispute occurs, Alice can deny her having signed message m 1 
. Under the attack, the probability of successful cheating is 1/2. In fact, Alice can arbitrarily choose an integer a such that v a = 1 mod n since she knows the factors p and q. The probability of successful cheating is not 1/2 but 1/a, where a ³ 2. In other words, if the value is larger, the probability of successful cheating is smaller. To ensure the security of our scheme, the integer b should be equal to or greater than a in Equation (1).
From the above analysis, the modified version of Ohta-okamoto digital signature for batch verification strong enough to withstand Hwang et al.'s attacks [14] and Bao et al.'s attack [1] .
Performance Analysis and Software Implement
This section shows that the computational complexity performances of the proposed scheme and Ohta-Okatmoto scheme for t digital signatures. For facilitating the computational complexity, the following notations are defined. Table 1 , it is obvious that computation of verifying t signatures in our scheme is fewer than that in Ohta-Okatmoto scheme. T EXP is much larger than other computations and we can see that the computations of Ohta-Okatmoto scheme increase by 2t whereas our scheme is fixed by a constant 2. The simulations are performed with a simulator in Java. A PC (2.49GHz Pentium 4 with 2GB of RAM) is used to execute the simulations. The key length is 2048-bit and the hash function MD5 is used in the proposed scheme. Figure 1 is the average of 100 executed results for different numbers of signatures (from t = 2, 4, …, 20) in our scheme and Ohta-Okatmoto scheme. It can be seen that the execution time of our scheme is obviously better than that of Ohta-Okatmoto scheme.
Multi-signature
In this section, the modified Ohta-okamoto scheme in Section II is extended to a multisignature version. Multi-signatures allow multiple signers to jointly authenticate a message using a single compact signature [28] . Without loss of generality, assume that k signers (U 1 , U 2 , …, U k ) want to sign the message m. The parameters {L, n, p, q, m, h(×)}. Let s i Î R Z n as U i 's private key and y = s -L mod n as U i 's public key. The k signers perform the following steps to generate a multi-signature.
Step 1: U i chooses an integer r i Î R Z n and computes u i = r i L mod n. Then broadcasts r i to other signers.
Step 2: After receiving r j from U j ( ≠ ), U i computes   =     (  ,…,  ,) mod .
Step 3 
If Equation (3) holds, the multi-signature (u 1 , u 2 , …, u k , z) on the message m is correct. The correctness of Equation (3) If t multi-signatures are generated, the batch verification is the same as that in Section 2. Therefore, the modified Ohta-Okatmoto multi-signature scheme for batch verification is still efficient.
Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed an alternative type of digital signature based on Ohta-Okatmoto scheme to achieve batch verification. In our scheme, the verifier can only verify multiple digital signatures at the cost of one verification session rather than verifying each individual digital signature separately. Moreover, our scheme has the same security level as the original Ohta-Okatmoto digital signature scheme, and it can withstand Hwang et al.'s attack and Bao et al.'s attack. From the results of software implement, it can be seen that the proposed is much more efficient than Ohta-Okatmoto scheme. The proposed scheme can be easily extended to a multi-signature scheme. Multiple multisignature signatures can be also performed batch verification efficiently.
